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1 Relations  between the  People’s  Republic  of  China  and Taiwan are  often considered
particularly  delicate,  not  to  say  conflicting.  Generally  speaking,  the  observer’s
attention is focused on the factors that separate the two sides and threaten to bring
them to armed conflict.  Yet,  in light of  the increasingly significant development of
their trading, academic and cultural relations,  it  seems useful also to study all  that
helps to bring the two sides together,  and thus to throw light on points of contact
between them.
2 While  the  present  dispute  dates  back  now  over  fifty  years,  and  while  no  political
resolution has so far been identified, links between the two societies have been formed.
In general, a political settlement is required first, before two human collectivities that
have been divided by war can be reunited. But where these cross-Strait relations are
concerned, a contrary dynamic seems to have been established; and that allows us to
adopt a more positive view of developments ahead.
3 To  speak  of  reconciliation  between  the  People’s  Republic  and  Taiwan  may  seem
premature, even unrealistic. Yet, this prospect has been raised several times over by
political  leaders  in  Taipei  as  in  Peking.  And  Chinese  and  Taiwanese  engineers—
dreamers, of course—have gone so far as to imagine building a tunnel that would link
the island to the mainland, a project they judge technically feasible1.  What an ideal
vision this is, in terms of peace and reconciliation! It would be a real umbilical cord,
joining  at  last  these  two countries,  these  two peoples,  across  five  decades  of  open
hostility.
4 In this state of mind, and in the conviction that peace rests upon a change of mentality
and  is  built  on  the  basis  of  a  pacific  and  open perception  of  other  people,  I  have
embarked upon a survey of Chinese and Taiwanese youth. So far, 40 people have taken
part: 30 in France and ten in mainland China. Ten more interviews will be conducted in
Taiwan. The participants, all university students, are aged between 23 and 33. Each is
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invited, following a preset questionnaire2, to speak about the same period of Chinese
history: the four decades between 1910 and 19503.
5 While  the  development  of  economic  and  cultural  links  is  favourable  to  a  possible
process of reconciliation, it seems that reconciliation also requires people to look back
less harshly on the past and to accept a common account of those tragic events that
have led to  bitterness  and war.  Thus the questions have been framed to  bring the
participants  to  draw  upon  a  generality  of  data  arising  both  from  their  historical
knowledge  and  also  from  a  collective  and  individual  store  of  memory.  My  aim  in
approaching these young people, in addition to highlighting the dominant historical
account in China and Taiwan, is to understand the perception that each group has of
this moment of history and to identify how individuals represent it to themselves. How
do they imagine the Others? How do they see themselves in sharing their stores of
history and memory with the Others? Can they imagine a common future within an
entirely peaceful social and political context?
Two rival political entities ...
6 The end of the Second World War, with the capitulation of the Japanese armed forces
and their withdrawal from the territories of mainland China and Taiwan, allowed the
renewal  of  hostilities  between Chinese  Communists  and Nationalists.  The two sides
found it impossible to reach a compromise settlement. They confronted each other as
two antagonistic political entities: the People’s Republic of China, based in Peking, and
the Republic of China, based in Taipei. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate
representatives of the Chinese people in their totality.
7 International recognition was awarded first of all to the Nationalist government led by
Chiang Kai-shek. In the wake of decolonisation, there was a change in the international
context; the process of normalising relations between Washington and Peking began;
and both led in 1971 to a reversal of the situation. Indeed, Peking became a permanent
member of the UN Security Council and was accorded, by most states, that political
recognition that had hitherto been denied.
8 At  the  start  of  the  1990s,  the  Taiwanese  President,  Lee  Teng-hui,  abolished  the
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of  Communist  Rebellion that,  for
forty years, had in a symbolic sense been maintaining the people of Taiwan and the
Penghu Archipelago in a state of civil war and provided a basis for Peking’s mission to
recapture  it.  This  development  has  allowed  the  beginnings  of  a  policy  of
rapprochement with China, reflected in unofficial meetings between two private bodies
entrusted with handling technical or commercial questions connected with cross-Strait
exchanges. Acting for Taiwan was the Strait Exchange Foundation and for China the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait.
9 In  Taiwan,  the  ending of  martial  law was  coupled with democratisation,  which,  by
allowing pluralism, has also made possible the emergence of a new political discourse,
strongly  territorialist,  articulated  by  the  Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP).
Independence rapidly came to the forefront of its claims. This was to lead to a break
with the constitutional framework of the Republic of China and the proclamation of the
Republic of Taiwan. Links with mainland China (including historical and cultural ties)
were minimised, thus removing all justification for reunification plans.
10 Yet, it was during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, the DPP leader, that a new step
towards exchanges with the mainland was taken in June 2000. The Three Mini Links
(xiao santong) permitted trade, transport and postal exchanges between, on one side,
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the two closest islands of the Archipelago to the mainland, Kinmen and Matsu and, on
the other, the province of Fujian: the links were to be direct, with no obligation to pass
through Hong Kong or Macao. Further, they allowed Chinese nationals to visit the two
islands  for  trading purposes  and,  for  the  first  time,  the  rest  of  the  Archipelago  as
tourists.
11 In January 2003, air communications were established. Charter flights were organised
for the whole period of the Chinese New Year holiday, to allow Taiwanese businessmen
settled on the mainland, and their families, to go back to Taiwan. Yet, citing security
reasons,  Taipei  allowed  only  Taiwanese  airlines  to  fly  the  route.  In  any  case,  this
necessarily  meant flying via Hong Kong or Macau and terminating at  Shanghai;  no
other destination was permitted.
12 In February 2005, charter flights were again made available to Taiwanese businessmen.
The scope here was far more significant than in 2003. For one thing, authorisation for
flights to Taiwan was now extended to mainland companies. And such flights could for
the  first  time  be  direct,  with  no  obligatory  stopovers  in  Hong  Kong  or  Macau.
Destinations on the mainland could be Peking, Shanghai or Canton. In Taiwan they
could be Taipei or Kaohsiung4. The success of these direct flights was so great that the
authorities on both sides of the Strait expressed the wish to continue the experiment
beyond the holiday period, beginning with cargo flights5.
13 Additionally,  the  spring  2005  visits  to  China  by  Lien  Chan, then  President  of  the
Kuomintang (KMT), and James Soong, President of the People First Party (PFP), came to
have a dynamic effect on the development of cross-Strait relations6. 
... strides along the path to reconciliation?
14 President Chen Shui-bian has twice expressed a desire for reconciliation with mainland
China. In May 2000, on the occasion of his inaugural address, he explained the new
orientation that he aspired to give to cross-Strait relations. His pledge, known as the
Four No’s and One Without (sibu yi meiyou)7, was conceived, he said, in an environment
of  goodwill,  a  state  of  mind  on  both  sides  of  the  Strait  that  was  favourable  to
reconciliation and to the achievement of sustainable peace. In February 2005, when the
defeat  of  the  Democratic  Progressive  Party  in  the  local  elections  pushed  the
government  towards  reaching  a  consensus  with  opposition  leaders  better  disposed
towards Peking, Chen appealed anew for progress towards cross-Strait reconciliation
and co-operation8. 
15 A few months later, a Chinese Communist Party theorist was to declare that the Party’s
policy was that of reconciliation with Taiwan9.
16 Of course, one may doubt these politicians’ sincerity or, at the very least, remembering
that their intentions are strictly political, one should not attach undue weight to their
declarations. This will help to understand Chen’s apparent changes of heart. Several
times over,  he has  challenged the policy  of  appeasement towards the mainland.  In
particular, on February 27th 2006, he went back on the commitment expressed in the
Four No’s and One Without, announcing that the Council for National Unification would
“cease to function” and that its Guidelines would “cease to apply”. Caught off balance,
the United States had succeeded only in negotiating a softening of the terminology. The
word  “abolish”  had  not  been  used,  in  deference  to  Chinese  sensitivities10.  Chen’s
initiative will undoubtedly give rise to new tensions with Peking as well as with those
Taiwanese political groupings opposed to independence.
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17 Even  so,  these  recurrent  tensions  have  not  so  far  prevented  the  emergence  of  an
embryo form of civil society linking the peoples of the two territories. The Taiwanese
mainland  community  has  grown  considerably.  It  is  particularly  extensive  in  the
Shanghai region where people often refer to the existence of a “little Taiwan”11. Mixed
marriages are frequent,  particularly between Taiwanese men and mainland women.
This human community which, in a sense, embodies the link between the two societies
is a source of political pressure. Indeed, the direct flights that began in February 2005
owed a great deal to sustained pressure exerted by Taiwanese entrepreneurs living in
China. The same can be said of the gradual relaxation of Taiwanese laws governing
mixed marriages, to take into account the interests of mainland spouses. Such links are
made easier by the fact that the two peoples share so much of their historical and
cultural heritage.
A shared history . . .
18 The Civil War and the splitting up of the territories are still at the forefront of memory
in mainland China. Recollections are passed on to the younger generation in the stories
told by elder generations. In Taiwan, outside the mainlanders’ families, these events
belong in imagined memory, part of the history of the national community within the
context of the state’s particular destiny, in this instance that of the Republic of China.
And  through  novels  or  films,  and  coloured  by  patriotic  feeling,  the  memory  takes
shape; and it has been able to impart emotional and affective substance to the official
history. For young Chinese people, looking back over these moments of history does
nothing to disturb the feeling of national belonging; but the issue for the Taiwanese
proves far more sensitive. Looking back over the history of the Republic of China, with
reawakened  memories  of  the  break  with  the  mainland,  amounts  to  a  bewildering
exposure to a complex and now strongly politicised identity.
19 The question of the connection with China springs unavoidably to the minds of young
people in Taiwan, bringing in its train a series of questions. What share of loyalty is
owed to the land of one’s birth, or to one’s country of origin? Where do people stand in
regard to this moment of history, when in Taipei the question of independence has
become,  with  the  passing  of  the  years,  a  question  of  honour,  and  of  pride  in  the
national community? And then, what should they make of those chevaleresque epics
about warring kingdoms? Of the military and political greatness of the Qin Dynasty? Of
the  cultural  influence  of  the  Tang Dynasty?  Of  the  humiliation represented by  the
Opium Wars? Of dignity regained on the day the Republic of China was formed, or of
the feeling on hearing its national anthem today? Of the words they pronounce, or the
Chinese characters they draw? Questioning the collective, family or individual career
must,  in the depths of the memories aroused,  affect the perceptions that all  young
people make of their own identities and futures, within an unusually troubled political
and geostrategic context.
... multifarious representation
20 Those  taking  part  in  the  survey  were  born  between 1972  and  1982;  they  are  aged
between 23 and 33. While all their families originate from mainland China, they have
grown up with the policies of reform and openness launched in 1978 while benefiting,
unlike their parents, from some measure of material comfort. Although they did not
personally witness the political violence of the Maoist period, all but the youngest can
look  back  to  the  Tian’anmen  events  of  June  4th  1989.  The  questionnaire  does  not
address  the  years  following  the  formation  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China.  Yet,
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recalling family experience inevitably draws these young people into a critical analysis
of contemporary political history. Those participants questioned in Paris are usually
more restrained in their views, the drawbacks of the Maoist period being moderated by
pragmatic considerations linked to the sociopolitical context of the time and minimised
in light of the subsequent economic success of the Deng Xiaoping era. By contrast, the
people questioned in China have, curiously, far less positive attitudes. Some have no
hesitation  in  condemning  the  vagaries  of  Maoism,  especially  during  the  Cultural
Revolution, and they often regret the absence of freedom of expression or of worship in
present-day  China.  This  difference  in  viewpoint  may  certainly  be  explained  by
geographic  distance.  It  is  as  though  the  annoyances  and  the  disappointments  of
everyday life in a foreign land has bolstered, among the students settled in France,
feelings of loyalty and patriotic attachment to their country of origin12.
21 Of the Taiwanese participants, the oldest were born well before martial law was lifted.
They received a traditional education tending to emphasise the feeling of belonging to
the Chinese nation. Some can remember that their school textbooks still spoke of the
recapture of the mainland as an ideal to be achieved13. It was often at home that they
learned that such discourse was somewhat fanciful. As young adults they witnessed the
coming to power of Lee Teng-hui. Attracted by the prospects of openness that the new
political  leadership  allowed  them  to  glimpse,  they  mostly  joined  the  emancipation
movements of the 1990s, and were then caught up in the turmoil of questioning―of
their nationalism, of their identity―that was to follow. The younger ones, who were
barely five years old at the time when martial  law was lifted,  grew up in a society
marked by the division created between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity. At
the time when Chen Shui-bian was embarking on his first presidential term, they were
just coming out of adolescence. Yet, their perspectives on the history of the split and on
the question of relations with China are apparently more distanced, less emotionally
involved,  than  those  of  their  elders.  When it  comes  to  the  young  people  living  in
France, their lives abroad seem also to have affected the feelings connecting them to
the country of their birth14.  Several of them remarked, indeed, that while they saw
themselves before leaving Taiwan as having both Chinese and Taiwanese identity, their
experience of living in France (for reasons that I shall mention later on) had brought
them to favour a strictly Taiwanese identity for the future.
22 Faced with this moment of history, the participants will spontaneously favour several
events that, for them, are the most meaningful: the formation of the Republic of China,
the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Civil War. They will also refer back with
pride to some dynasties of ancient China. Lastly, they will speak of those Others, living
on the mainland or in Taiwan, other people whom often they have met but who remain,
however, unfamiliar.
The Republic of China
23 The participants are agreed on one point: they acknowledge the 1911 Revolution as one
of the most significant events of the period. Yet, the understanding they have formed
of this moment of history differs somewhat from person to person.
24 For the Chinese, the 1911 Revolution, which brought about the creation of the Republic
of China, put an end to the humiliation undergone at the hands of Western countries.
They had taken advantage of the weakness of the Qing Dynasty to occupy significant
areas of the country during the latter half of the nineteenth century and had acquired,
by a series of military victories over the Chinese, extensive privileges. Thus, many will
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recall with strong feelings the derisive phrase once used for their country, the “Sick
Man of East Asia”15. These young people see the Republic of China as having given back
dignity and hope to the Chinese people. They see the new Republic, which had brought
to  an  end  the  dynastic  system,  as  promising  political  and  social  development  that
would steadily bring their country towards modernity―then envisaged as a Western
achievement.
25 This feeling of national humiliation is also mentioned by the Taiwanese, though with
markedly less bitterness. It seems that they prefer to dwell on the intellectual, political
and cultural renewal that the Republic of China ushered in. Though they also consider
that it brought new hope for China, they are less concerned with washing away the
humiliations  inflicted  by  the  West  than  with  building  a  powerful  and  prosperous
country. 
26 The overwhelmingly positive perception that they have of the 1911 Revolution brings
all of them to pick out Sun Yat-sen, among all the political figures of the time, as the
man they consider as “Father of the Nation” (WW, guofu). The nation itself they are
unanimous in seeing as linked, at that time, to the institutions and the political context
of the Republic of China. Similarly, they are as one in regretting the failure of the state
and the society that it had set out to create. They attribute this project, often quite
exclusively, to the efforts of Sun Yat-sen. They consider it to have been aborted in 1925,
the  year  of  his  death.  The  Republic  of  China  that  once  included  the  whole  of  the
Chinese nation and extended across the whole of its territory is, in their eyes, non-
existent today. Of course, there is still a political entity called the “Republic of China”,
which everyone agrees is situated in Taiwan; but, as they describe it, it appears devoid
of its original national substance. It no longer corresponds to the Chinese nation in the
human and territorial dimension of the times. In the same way, it  no longer seems
really  associated  in  their  minds  with  the  idealised  personality  of  Sun  Yat-sen,  but
rather with the power struggle that broke out on his death within the Kuomintang, as
well as with the Civil War and the territorial break-up that followed it. Nevertheless, it
is still historically significant and, for the Taiwanese, has retained a cultural meaning
that influences most of them deeply.
27 Indeed, unlike the People’s Republic, which Maoism has distanced from the canons of
the Chinese cultural tradition, the Republic of China, eager to affirm its legitimacy in
representing and perpetuating the essence of the nation, has set a special value on
them. The policy of emphasising Chinese culture that was adopted in the early 1950s in
Taiwan also helped to spread the traditions. These cultural values, implanted from the
early  years  of  schooling,  are  a  source  of  pride  to  the  Taiwanese  students.  For  this
reason they all regret the simplified form of writing that has been introduced on the
mainland,  with the mutilation it  has  inflicted on Chinese characters.  They are also
surprised by a certain coarseness of language, which they generally put down to the
influence of Maoist rhetoric. When it comes to interpersonal relationships, these seem
to be lacking in the gentleness and subtlety appropriate to the standards of conduct
prescribed by the Confucian heritage16.  They ascribe the destruction of these moral
values (which they often call meide (WW) or “absolute virtue”) to the period of the
Cultural Revolution. 
28 Thus, all of them are agreed on one conclusion, that the political project of the Republic
of China was a failure, ending in the break-up of 1949. Nevertheless, it seems that this
break-up  is  perceived  differently  by  the  Chinese  and  the  Taiwanese.  The  Chinese
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particularly deplore the splitting up of the nation, which they see in terms of its human
and territorial consequences: they say China has been brutally despoiled of one of its
provinces. Whereas for the Taiwanese, the break-up is hardly seen at all in nationalist
terms, but rather in terms of history and morality. It is as though they felt themselves
entrusted  with  a  system  of  values  and  a  destiny  that  the  mainland  Chinese  have
abandoned.
29 For the Taiwanese, the Republic of China is now strictly limited to the territory and the
people  of  Taiwan―even  though,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  it  is  still  invested  with  a
historical and cultural dimension transcending these geographical limits. Nevertheless,
state symbols always appeal strongly to young people’s emotions: they say they are
moved to hear the national anthem, and to see their flag being raised. And they would
like  such  symbols  to  be  more  visible,  particularly  during  sports  contests  at  the
international level where Taiwanese athletes are competing. As things are, to avert the
anger of Peking, the Taiwanese teams are saluted under the colours of an “Olympic
Flag”, to the strains of an “Olympic Anthem”, specially prepared for such occasions.
30 Yet, and this is where ambiguousness creeps in, most would prefer to see the name
Taiwan printed on their passports, not the Republic of China. As they point out, the
mention of China can cause confusion in the minds of foreign hosts who, mistaking
them for citizens of the People’s Republic of China, can judge them by a set of not
always favourable prejudices17. Similarly, they are often inclined to claim an exclusively
Taiwanese identity, to the detriment of the attachment they feel for the historical and
cultural dimension of the Republic of China. Indeed, to acknowledge citizenship of the
Republic of China amounts, for some of them, to validating the nationalist discourse
that they have heard in the mouths of their Chinese fellow-students18. Thus, many will
say  they  have  joined  the  pro-independence  movement,  in  order  to  show  that  the
solution of unification with China is far from being achieved. In fact, putting a distance
between themselves and the Chinese world is the equivalent, for some, to claiming a
right, that of deciding Taiwan’s future. It would seem as though the strength of the
nationalist  sentiments  encountered  among  Chinese  students,  often  asserted  in
unsolicited speeches about the future reunification of Taiwan with China, inclines these
young Taiwanese to favour symbolic referents that they know the Chinese students do
not share. So they insist on belonging to a strictly Taiwanese community, the corollary
of a national identity strictly limited to the frontiers of the island. Their approach is to
favour that which distinguishes them from the Others and consequently to minimise
the  influence  of  the  common  heritage  associated  with  Chinese  civilisation.  This
acceptance/rejection  dynamic  in  relation  to  the  Chinese  heritage  seems  to  have
especial  force for  those settled abroad,  where the confrontation with the Others  is
more destabilising, more weakening. Many participants tell me that they have never
felt  themselves  so  Taiwanese  as  they  do  since  they  arrived  in  France  and  started
meeting Chinese students19.
The War of Resistance Against Japan
31 The War of Resistance Against Japan is the second of the historical events of the period
1910-1949 picked out by the participants.  Curiously,  what they consider historically
important is neither the invasion of China by Japan nor the defeat of Japan at the end of
the  Second  World  War,  but  rather  the  success  of  the  War  of  Resistance  (kangri
zhanzheng shengli).
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32 All  our  participants  express  the  same feelings  on  this  subject:  the  shame of  being
invaded,  anger and sadness over the atrocities  committed by the Japanese soldiers,
particularly  in  Nanking  in  1937,  pride  in  the  alliance  between  nationalist  and
communist troops in the struggle against the occupying forces and the joy of victory.
Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, both sides refer explicitly to the feeling of national
pride over this  outcome.  The Taiwanese appeal  to  what  they call  their  “nationalist
heart” (minzuxin)20 to fuse with this moment of history and make it completely theirs.
At this point in the questionnaire, it is as though the China/Taiwan distinction was no
longer real in their minds. The majority of the Taiwanese, whether they be islanders or
mainlanders, identify wholly with the protagonists in this historical episode. Yet, at
that time, Taiwan was a Japanese colony and its inhabitants, subjects of the Japanese
Emperor, were having to fight alongside the Japanese troops21. Also, the explanations
they offer for the defeat of  the Japanese are invariably couched in the language of
nationalism. In particular, they insist that it is impossible for any invaders, whoever
they  may be,  to  defeat  a  united  people  determined to  drive  them out.  The  Pacific
campaign waged by the Americans and the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are not systematically mentioned or, if they are, not until much later in their
replies.
33 This community of feeling is also found in their evaluation of the Civil War.
The struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists
34 Among the  events  of  the  period  1910-1950,  this  one,  for  the  students,  is  the  most
regretted. Some, both Taiwanese and Chinese, describe the war as “fratricidal” (da ziji
ren). Mostly their accounts of it are lucid, though not necessarily faithful to official
interpretations.  Thus, according to them, the war came about  because the political
leaders of the time, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, found it impossible to reach a
negotiated solution. For that they would have to have made concessions, and to have
relinquished some of their prerogatives and a portion of their power. However, the
young people attribute responsibilities differently. The Chinese interviewed in France
more  commonly  condemn Chiang  Kai-shek’s  ambition;  whereas  some of  those  who
spoke  to  me  in  China  did  not  hesitate  to  mention  the  conception,  in  their  view
exaggeratedly monopolistic, that Mao adopted of the exercise of power. The Taiwanese
see the question more objectively and impute the struggle to the overweening ambition
of both men. Mostly they emphasise the cynicism of politicians, and the misfortunes
that this can lead to.  By contrast,  they venerate the figure of Sun Yat-sen: in their
imagination,  as  in  Chinese  notions  as  well,  he  appears  untainted  by  any  political
manoeuvring and truly devoted to the good of the nation.
35 Regrets surface more precisely regarding the situation following the Civil War. For the
Chinese, it led to the break with Taiwan and so, as I have already pointed out, to the
splitting up of the nation in human and territorial terms. They see this state of affairs
as  regrettable  and,  in  particular,  as  difficult  to resolve.  While  they  are  mostly
favourable to reunification, they reject any prospect of war; yet, they are agreed in
judging that it could happen. They stress also that human and material losses would be
considerable on both sides, but that China, unlike Taiwan, benefits from territorial and
demographic power that would enable it to absorb the shock.
36 Among the Taiwanese, the analysis is again particularly ambiguous. Admittedly, the
Civil War is seen to have led to the break of 1949, but also and above all as having
plunged China, because of the Communist victory, into a new and particularly harmful
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political  and social  organisation.  They are  sorry  that  the  country  subsequently  fell
behind  in  economic  development;  and  they  deplore  the  political  violence  and  the
damage  inflicted  upon  the  cultural  tradition.  They  think  that  China,  without  the
tragedy of war and the errors of Maoism, would have become a world power to which
perhaps, though this is not openly expressed, they might have felt proud to belong.
This nostalgia for a powerful, prosperous and respected China can be sensed also in
their overall view of its history.
Deep respect for ancient history
37 The period of China’s history that our participants have least pleasure in dwelling upon
is  precisely  that  concerned  in  the  questionnaire.  It  makes  them sad,  disappointed,
regretful.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  happy  to  talk  about  ancient  history  with
particular admiration for the Qin and Tang Dynasties. While they acclaim in the Tang
Dynasty its cultural and artistic influence, they point to the political genius of the man
who founded the Qin Dynasty, Emperor Qin Shihuang. They praise his achievements
and, especially, the unification of the territory and the system of writing. Though they
do not  shut  their  eyes  to  the authoritarian and violent  way in  which he exercised
power, they justify it by the greatness of what was achieved.
38 This  judgement  may  seem  surprising,  especially  in  light  of  the  criticisms  made  of
present-day political  leaders,  and of  the reservations that  the Taiwanese invariably
express about the reunification project. Its meaning must be sought, however, in the
very particular perception that these students have of what a political leader’s mission
should be in relation to the national future.
39 As  may  be  seen  from the  first  results  of  the  survey,  these  Chinese  and  Taiwanese
students have in common a number of notions about the proposed moment of history.
Thus, it is right that we should end by asking how they perceive each other.
Who are the Others?
40 First of all,  they are undeniably capable of imagining the Others and how they feel,
even without having ever met them. They are particularly aware of the possibility that
all of them, depending on their origins, may have reached different conclusions about
the past. They ascribe this to the fact that the teaching of history in their respective
societies will have been strongly influenced by politics. They can easily imagine the
prejudices that young people of their generation may foster; and they recognise, most
of  them,  that  they  themselves  will  have  been  conditioned  by  a  biased  political
discourse. Many of them, giving me the details of such propaganda, were keen to stress
how insulting  were  its  references  to  the  designated enemy,  concluding that  it  was
better not to repeat them.
41 For those studying abroad,  the opportunities for encountering the Others are quite
frequent. The students often find themselves in the same educational institutions, and
also sometimes they share the same accommodation. It is not unusual for them to find
things in common; and friendships are all the easier to make if both sides carefully
avoid delicate  questions.  While  they may discuss  the political  situation in China or
Taiwan,  they  will  prefer  not  to  dwell  on  possible  solutions  to  the  cross-Strait
relationship, without being sure of holding the same, shared convictions.
42 Yet, if there is no intention of becoming friends, each side may be less tolerant of the
other’s susceptibilities. As I said earlier, several of the Taiwanese had been offended by
what  they considered the  arrogance of  their  Chinese  fellow-students,  an arrogance
reflected in a heightened nationalism that was immovably set upon the reunification of
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Taiwan  to  China.  In  situations  of  this  kind,  the  Others  then  appear  in  all  their
otherness.
43 Some of the Taiwanese, indeed, deny any membership of a community that would also
include the Chinese22. They expand on this assertion by pointing out all that separates
the peoples on opposite sides of the Strait: their language, the way they are, the way
they behave...  While  they  recognise  that  they too  speak Mandarin,  they emphasise
nevertheless those features of their Mandarin that make it distinct from that spoken on
the mainland. On top of that, as I have described before, they mention a whole range of
values associated with the Chinese cultural tradition that they say they cannot discern
in their Chinese fellow-students. So much so that they feel a distance, an inability to
form any personal relationships with them. In general, they use the term gehe (WW),
which may be translated as “barrier”.
44 Curiously, these are the same arguments that most of the young Chinese use to show
how both sides do belong to the “same family”. They consider that both sides have in
common  their  language,  culture,  civilisation;  above  all,  they  consider  that  a  blood
relationship has been handed down to them across the generations. And yet, the same
people will not hesitate, when they are pressed a little further about their territorial
origins,  to differentiate themselves from the people of  some other province,  whose
dialect, way of life, temperament seem to them so different... Thus, while those from
Peking acknowledge themselves also to be Han23, they feel no less different from the
people  of  Shanghai  or  from  Canton!  And  the  Cantonese  are  themselves  quick  to
mention all those features that distinguish them from other Chinese people. So what
can  we  say  about  the  national  minorities?  They  are  presented  as  unquestionably
Chinese, even though not Han, but also displaying cultural features that, often, make
them seem somewhat strange or, at least, put them outside what I call the “circle of
intimacy”. 
45 Following  the  same  logic,  the  Taiwanese  who  consider  Taiwan  as  the  only  human
community  to  which  they  belong,  and  who  feel  themselves  absolutely  foreign  to
mainland  society,  will  themselves  hasten  to  make  distinctions  according  to  the
plurality of communal loyalties present across the island. Thus, mainlanders are not
necessarily part of that circle of intimacy; they often find close relationships easier
with people of Taiwanese origin. Yet, all of these people are considered as Han and,
above all, as Taiwanese.
46 If these young people are not yet ready to feel themselves part of the “same family”,
can they  look ahead into  a  peaceful  future,  both political  and social,  in  which the
Others would have a full place?
How do they envisage their future?
47 All of them deny any prospect of war, even though they do not consider it to be totally
impossible. They are satisfied by the present state of things. Yet, some young Chinese
people point out that dragging out the present situation is likely with time to make any
settlement of the Taiwan question all the more difficult to resolve. Thus, they hope that
reunification will soon be achieved while avoiding, within the limits of the possible, any
recourse to armed force. While the Taiwanese can be annoyed by the nationalism of
some Chinese people, their lack of enthusiasm for the reunification project never fails
to amaze the Chinese―who cannot understand the reluctance of the Taiwanese and are
saddened, even offended, by it. Indeed, they have full confidence in China’s future, and
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they consider the return of Taiwan as an additional asset to the country, by which its
people on both sides could benefit.
48 The Taiwanese, however, are troubled about their future and that of their island. Most
of them are pained by the domestic political wrangling in Taiwan. In particular they
condemn the politicians for manipulating people’s community loyalties. Most of them
consider  that  the  radical  pro-independence  campaigners  propound  arguments  that
take no account of  Taiwan’s  security  or  of  the reality  of  Peking’s  superior  military
might.
49 They  often  feel  themselves  torn  between  policies  insisting  upon  Taiwan’s  cultural
individuality, and cultural referents that are mainly Chinese. They find it difficult to
see themselves within one basic identity; and the confidence that they find among most
of their Chinese counterparts only intensifies their unease. Unification is envisaged,
but exclusively in the long term. They would like, beforehand, to be assured of an equal
level  of  economic  development  in  both  territories,  and  of  the  establishment  of  a
democratic system on the mainland.
50 All of them, on both sides, wish that they knew each other better; and they condemn
their  respective  societies  for  not  making  more  information  available.  The  Chinese,
especially, would like to visit Taiwan more easily. They appear very curious about this
land and its people: they would wish to welcome them, like the prodigal son, to the
blossoming  openness  and  development  that,  for  several  years  now,  has  been
transforming China.
51 Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
NOTES
1. “China, Taiwan experts discuss cross-Strait tunnel”, Newswrap programme on Radio
Television Hong Kong (RTHK) audio website, November 8th 2005.
2. Until the survey is complete it will not be possible to report the content of the
questionnaire; this must wait until a future piece of work. The present article reports
the preliminary results of those interviews already conducted.
3. To simplify, we may pick out within this period the following events: 1) The
Wuchang uprising on October 10th 1911, later known as the Xinhai Revolution, which
led to the formation of the Republic of China in Nanking in January 1912, its
government initially presided over by Sun Yat-sen; 2) The Northern Expedition begun
in 1926 by the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek, aimed at recruiting or
subjugating the warlords; 3) The start of the Japanese Occupation, in Manchuria 1931;
4) The development of political activity by the Chinese Communist Party and the
Nationalist government’s intensified repression of the Communists (1927-1937); 5) The
war of resistance against Japan waged simultaneously by Nationalist forces and the
People’s Liberation Army led by Mao Zedong (1937-1945). The Civil War, between
Nationalists and Communists, from 1945 to 1949. It ended with the formation of the
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People’s Republic of China, in Peking, on October 1st 1949 and with the withdrawal of
the Nationalists to Taipei.
4. “Cross-Strait Relations are Improving Again”, The Economist, February 3rd 2005.
5. “Taiwan open to talk on cross-Strait – two-way, non-stop – cargo flights”, Central
News Agency website, Taipei, February 18th 2005.
6. However, these two visits caught the governing DPP unawares, and to some extent
marginalised the government’s role in the dynamic of relations between the two sides.
7. The Four No’s: independence would not be declared, the name of the state would not
be changed (from Republic of China to Republic of Taiwan or to Taiwan), the concept of
“two states” would not be included in the Constitution and, lastly, there would be no
referendum on Taiwanese independence. The One Without was that Chen promised not
to abolish the National Unification Council or the National Unification guidelines.
“Taiwan-China Relations”, in Taiwan Yearbook, Government Information Office, Taipei,
2004, p. 5.
8. “Taiwan President hopes for cross-Strait peace”, Central News Agency website,
Taipei, February 11th 2005. “Baoji chengxing, liang an jian shuguang” (The circulation
of charters, a glimmer of hope for both sides) Zhongguo shibao, February 17th 2005.
9. “Chinese theorist says Party seeks reconciliation with Taiwan”, Xinhua News Agency
website, November 3rd 2005.
10. “Hu Jintao pi zhongzhi guotong gangling shi yanzhong tiaoxin” (Hu Jintao criticises
the cessation in the application of the Guidelines for National Unification as a serious
provocation), Zhongguo shibao, February 28th 2006.
11. See Gilles Guiheux, “Taiwanais en Chine: une émigration à rebours?”, Politique
Internationale, 104, Summer 2004, pp. 375-386.
12. Time and again, they refer to their “patriotic heart” (WWW, aiguo xin) which means,
literally, “the heart that loves the nation”. This expression is never used by the
Taiwanese. 
13. For the processes of socialisation in East Asia, see Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones, 
History, Education and Identity in East Asia, New York, Routledge, 2005.
14. As the survey in Taiwan has not yet been conducted, it is not possible for the time
being to make any comparison with the young people who have not left the country.
15. They say that the origin of this phrase was the sickly appearance of the Chinese
consumers of opium. As they rightly point out, the trade in the drug arose from the
activities of foreign powers in China.
16. They generally refer to the lunli (WW), which is the comprehensive set of principles
governing social duties.
17. The Taiwanese visitor to France is often advised to stress that he or she is from
Taiwan, rather than from the Republic of China. If we are to believe the Taiwanese
students, it seems that officials in the public services, particularly those in the
prefectures, are quick to assume a connection between anyone “Chinese” and the
illegal immigrants from the People’s Republic. It is often enough to say that one is from
Taiwan for the welcome suddenly to become more friendly and relaxed. I don’t know
how many people have actually had this experience because, in the interviews, the
young people relating it invariably begin with “I am told that . . .” Nevertheless, it is a
familiar story, and one that most of the participants have told me. Whether these
representations associated with the mainland Chinese have their origin in observed
facts, or whether they have been quite simply invented, they are today firmly lodged in
the minds of these Taiwanese students.
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18. As though, for them, anything “Chinese” necessarily refers to the People’s Republic.
19. This tendency, seemingly in the majority, is nevertheless not unanimous. Some
Taiwanese participants are quick to acknowledge an identity that is Chinese first; and
they do not seem to suffer unduly from the nationalism of their Chinese fellow-
students. This point will have to be studied more closely at a later date. Here I am
offering only the outlines of the subject.
20. A distinction needs to be made here between the “patriotic heart” cited by the
Chinese and the “nationalist heart” referred to by the Taiwanese. In the first case, the
young people are speaking of the feelings of loyalty and attachment that bind them to
their country, the People’s Republic of China. In the second, the Taiwanese give
expression to their belonging to the Chinese nation in the historical and cultural
senses. One might speak more simply of Chinese civilisation if descent, that is, blood
relationship, was not also so essentially valued and did not play such an important part
in this feeling of belonging. 
21. We should mention that some Taiwanese fighters went to the mainland to join the
united front of resistance to Japan.
22. This community is referred to in terms of family: they do not acknowledge the
Chinese people’s membership of the same family. The phrase used is often: “We are not
a family (WWWWWWW, women bu shi yijia ren).”
23. The Han are the ethnic group from which Chinese civilisation is said to have
sprung. Today it is one of the five main ethnic groups that make up the Chinese nation.
RÉSUMÉS
This  article  reports  on  the  first  results  of  a  survey  of  the  new  generation  of  Chinese  and
Taiwanese youth. The aim is to throw light on how these young people see their national history
and, in particular, the 1949 split that divided the Chinese community between two armies, and
later into two separate political  entities.  Reaching beyond the official  historical  account,  our
interest  here  is  in  the  young  people’s  perceptions,  and  the  points  on  which  they  agree  or
disagree. Acknowledged or not, a heritage of history and memory is shared between them: we
seek to evaluate the part it plays in the political development of relations across the Taiwan
Strait.
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